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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, J 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 890015-CA 
v. t 
CURTIS L. JONES, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from convictions of second degree felony 
burglary and second degree felony theft in the Second District 
Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to establish 
defendant's guilt of burglary and theft? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
Burglary - (1) A person is guilty of burglary 
if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with 
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit 
an assault on any person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
Theft - Elements - A person commits theft if 
he obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
over the property of another with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with second degree felony 
burglary and second felony degree theft. Defendant was convicted 
in a jury trial on November 14, 1988. Judge Roth sentenced 
defendant to the Utah State Prison for a term of not less than 
one year and not more than fifteen years for each charge. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 9, 1988, around 9:00 or 9:30 p.m., Thea Olson 
was awakened by her neighbor's dog. The dog had been barking for 
about fifteen to twenty minutes. Ms. Olson went to see her 
neighbor, Mike Jenkins, to have him quiet the dog (R. 36). When 
she arrived at Mr. Jenkins' house, she noticed the front door was 
open. Ms. Olson also saw two people crouched under a tree. She 
asked if it was Mike, and started toward the tree (R. 37). Both 
men took off running and one ran into her, knocking her over. 
However, she was able to get a good look at him because the porch 
lights and kitchen lights were on (R. 43-44). She began chasing 
defendant, but then ran back to get her car. She drove down the 
alley and saw one person jump the fence. The other man, the one 
who bumped into her, ran back to his vehicle (R. 41-42). 
Ms. Olson drove back to her house and told her 
roommate, Carrie Bell, to get in the vehicle. Ms. Bell had 
noticed a Nissan pick-up pull out, so they followed it (R. 63). 
While they were following the Nissan, defendant turned his head 
and Ms. Olson got another look at him (R. 43). Ms. Bell also got 
a look at defendant, describing him as having scars or acne and a 
thin face (R. 64). Ms. Olson had her high beams on and Ms. Bell 
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wrote down the sticker number of the vehicle, which was later 
discovered to be owned by defendant's girlfriend (R. 65, 71). 
Ms. Olson then discontinued the chase. 
After they returned, the police showed Ms. Olson three 
pictures of suspects. Ms. Olson picked defendant's picture as 
the person she chased (R. 51). A few weeks later, Ms. Olson was 
shown four different photos of suspects and she again picked 
defendant (R. 72-75). Also, at the trial, she identified 
defendant as the person who bumped into her (R. 60). 
Defendant claimed at trial he was not at the scene of 
the crime because his parole officer saw him at his home about 
8:30 that night and that he loaned the truck to Galveston Scott 
(R. 70). However, when the police questioned defendant, he could 
not explain where he was that night (R. 70). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant was positively identified three times by Ms. 
Olson and he fits Ms. Bell's description of the suspect. The 
Nissan pick-up, seen leaving the crime, is registered to 
defendant's girlfriend. Also, it was possible for defendant to 
drive to Mr. Jenkins' house in time to commit the crimes and 
there is circumstantial evidence he actually committed the crime. 
Thus, there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of 




THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT 
DEFENDANT OF BURGLARY AND THEFT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established a high standard 
of appellate review when the issue is sufficiency of the 
evidence. The Court will interfere only when "reasonable men 
could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt." State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah App. 1987) 
quoting State v. Lammf 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980). However, 
the Court accords great deference to the jury verdict because it 
is "the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and 
determine the credibility of the witnesses." Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 
at 412. All the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from 
the evidence should be reviewed in a light most favorable to the 
jury verdict. State v. Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 
1989), citing State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
Therefore, defendant has the burden of establishing the evidence 
"was so inconclusive or insubstantial as to preclude the jury 
from properly finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. 
Walker, 765 P.2d 874, 874 (Utah 1988). However, the Court will 
not reverse the verdict as long as there is some evidence, 
including reasonable inferences, supporting the elements of the 
crime. Walker, 765 P.2d at U74, quoting State v. Booker, 709 
P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). 
The statutory requirements of burglary and theft are: 
Burglary — (1) A person is guilty of 
burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully 
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in a building or any portion of a building 
with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
Theft — Elements — A person commits theft 
if he obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with the 
purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202, 76-6-404 (1978). 
As defendant concedes, there is no question a burglary 
and theft occurred at Mike Jenkins' home on August 9, 1988. The 
issue before the jury, and now on appeal, is simply 
identification of the perpetrator. 
Defendant contends "the jury convicted him on no 
substantial evidence that he in fact committed the crime . . . 
because of the faulty identification and evidence discrediting 
that identification . . . ." (Br. of App. at 15). A review of 
the substantial evidence placed before the jury reveals 
defendant's claim is without merit. 
Ms. Olson (neighbor of the burglary/theft victim) 
positively identified defendant in a photo line-up at the scene 
of the crime and at the police station. Ms. Olson also 
identified defendant at the trial. Ms. Olson's testimony was 
corroborated by Ms. Bell's description of the suspect. 
Ms. Olson testified that on August 9, 1988, she was 
awakened by Mr. Jenkins' dog (R. 36). When she went over to her 
neighbor's house, she noticed the front door was open. She also 
saw two people crouched under a tree (R. 38-39). When she 
approached them, both took off running. Ms. Olson got a good 
look at one man because he ran right into her (R. 56). Ms. Olson 
followed the defendant on foot and later in her vehicle with her 
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roommate, Ms. Bell. While she was following defendant in her 
vehicle, he turned his head and she got another look at him (R. 
43). Ms. Bell copied down the sticker number to the Nissan and 
then Ms. Olson turned around (R. 49). 
When Ms. Olson arrived back at the scene, the police 
showed her three suspects' pictures. Ms. Olson picked 
defendant's picture as the person she saw (R. 51). A few weeks 
later, at the police station, Ms. Olson was shown four photos and 
again picked defendant as the person who bumped into her (R. 72-
74). Furthermore, at the trial, Ms. Olson claimed defendant was 
"definitely the person at the scene." (R. 60). 
Although Ms. Bell testified she could not identify 
defendant, she described the suspect as having acne or scars and 
a thin fact (R. 64). Defendant fits this description. 
Furthermore, the Nissan pick-up Ms. Olson and Ms. Bell followed 
is owned by defendant's girlfriend (R. 71). The evidence 
presented would lead a reasonable person to believe, beryond a 
reasonable doubt, defendant was the man who bumped into Ms. 
Olson. 
Evidence was also presented which could lead the jury 
to infer defendant actually committed the crime. Mr. Jenkins was 
not home and his front door was wide open and there were two 
people crouched under a tree (R. 36, 38). Ms. Olson identified 
defendant as the person she saw stooped under the tree. The two 
suspects ran away when she approached them. The unidentified 
partner was carrying something under his arm and three white bags 
(R. 47). Defendant started off carrying two white bags but 
-6-
dropped them in the driveway (R. 48). Furthermore, Mr. Jenkins' 
side door was broken and his stereo equipment had been stolen (R. 
91). The circumstantial evidence presented would lead a jury to 
reasonably infer defendant committed the burglary and theft. 
Defendant claims the evidence he presented discredits 
the identification. First, defendant claims he loaned his truck 
to Galveston Scott for the evening and, thus, was not involved in 
the crime. Second, defendant argues his parole officer saw him 
at 8:36, thus, it would be impossible for him to be at Mr. 
Jenkins' home at the time the crime was committed. 
"It is the jury's duty to resolve all questions 
regarding the reliability of the testimony . . . ." Walker, 765 
P.2d at 874-75. The Court "must accept the version of facts 
which supports the judgment" when presented with conflicting 
evidence. State v. One 1982 Silver Honda Motorcycle, 735 P.2d 
392, 394 (Utah 1987) citing State v. Isaacson, 704 P.2d 555, 556 
(Utah 1985). The jury believed the facts presented by the State 
that defendant was involved in the crime. The jury must not have 
thought defendant's claim was reliable. Thus, the Court should 
accept the version of facts which supports the verdict, even 
though defendant claims there is conflicting evidence. 
In addition, it is not impossible for defendant to have 
been at Mr. Jenkins' home the night of the crime. Defendant's 
parole officer observed him at home at 8:36. However, had the 
parole officer testified, he would have said he doubled back by 
defendant's home and defendant was gone (R. 102). 
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Ms. Olson testified she was awakened about 9:00 or 9:30 
(R. 36). The dog had been barking about fifteen to twenty 
minutes (R. 36). Thus, the crime would have been committed 
anywhere between 8:40 and 9:15. 
It is about a twenty minute drive from defendant's 
house to Mr. Jenkins' house (R. 81). If defendant left right 
after his parole officer, he would have arrived at Mr. Jenkins' 
home at 9:00. Thus, he would have had plenty of time to commit 
the robbery. Given this time span, a jury could reasonably 
believe it was possible for defendant to commit the crime even 
without having heard the testimony of the parole officer. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the jury could believe, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant committed the burglary and 
theft. Thus, the state requests this Court to affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
DATED this day of June, 1989. 
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